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Abstract—The classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mech-
anism ensures incentive compatibility, i.e., truth-telling is a
dominant strategy for all agents, for a static one-shot game.
However, it does not appear to be feasible to construct mech-
anisms that ensure the dominance of dynamic truth-telling for
agents comprised of general stochastic dynamic systems. In a
dynamic stochastic system that unfolds randomly over time, the
agents’ intertemporal payoffs depend on the future controls and
payments, and a direct extension of the VCG mechanism does
not guarantee incentive compatibility. The contribution of this
paper is to show that such a stochastic dynamic extension does
exist for the special case of Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian (LQG)
agents. In fact it achieves subgame perfect dominance of truth
telling. This is accomplished through a construction of a sequence
of layered payments over time that decouples the intertemporal
effect of current bids on future payoffs if system parameters are
known and agents are rational.
An important motivating example of a problem needing such
optimal dynamic coordination of stochastic agents, arises in
power systems where an Independent System Operator has
to ensure balance of generation and consumption at all time
instants, while ensuring social optimality, i.e., maximization of
the sum of the utilities of all agents. In this application it is also
necessary to satisfy budget balance and individual rationality.
However, in general, even for static one-shot games, there is
no mechanism that simultaneous satisfies these requirements in
addition to being incentive compatible and social welfare optimal.
For a power market of LQG agents, we show that there is a
modified “Scaled” VCG mechanism that does satisfy incentive
compatibility, social efficiency, budget balance and individual
rationality under a certain “market power balance” condition
where no agent is too negligible or too dominant.
We further show another desirable property: the SVCG
payments converge to the Lagrange payments, defined as the
payments that correspond to the true price in the absence of
strategic considerations, as the number of agents in the market
increases.
For LQ but non-Gaussian agents, optimal social welfare over
the class of linear control laws is achieved.
Index Terms—Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, dy-
namic VCG, stochastic dynamic systems, LQG agents, incentive
compatibility, budget balance, individual rationality, social wel-
fare optimality, Independent System Operator (ISO).
I. INTRODUCTION
Mechanism design is the sub-field of game theory that
considers how to realize socially optimal solutions to problems
involving multiple self-interested agents, each with a private
utility function. A typical approach is to provide financial
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incentives such as payments to promote truth-telling of utility
function parameters by agents. An important example is the
Independent System Operator (ISO) problem of electric power
systems in which the ISO aims to maximize social welfare and
maintain balance of generation and consumption while each
generator/load has a private utility function.
The classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [1],
and its generalization, the Groves mechanism [2], play a
central role in mechanism design since they ensure incentive
compatibility, i.e., they ensure that truth-telling of utility
functions by all agents forms a dominant strategy, as well
as social welfare optimality, i.e., the sum of utilities of all
agents is maximized. The outcome generated by the Groves
mechanism is stronger than a Nash equilibrium in the sense
that it is strategy-proof, meaning that truth-telling of utility
functions is optimal irrespective of what others are bidding. In
fact, Green, Laffont and Holmstrom [3] show that the Groves
mechanism is the only mechanism that is both efficient and
strategy-proof if payoffs are quasi-linear, i.e., linear in the
amount of money.
While the Groves mechanism is applicable to a static one-
shot game, it does not work for stochastic dynamic games.
In a stochastic dynamic system that unfolds over time, the
agents’ intertemporal payoffs depend on the future controls
and payments, and a direct extension of the VCG mechanism
does not guarantee incentive compatibility. A fundamental dif-
ference between dynamic and static mechanism design is that
in the former, an agent can bid an untruthful utility function
conditional on its past bids (which need not be truthful) and
past allocations (from which it can make an inference about
other agents’ utility functions). For dynamic deterministic
systems, by collecting the VCG payments as a lump sum of
all the payments over the entire time horizon at the beginning,
incentive compatibility is still assured. However, for dynamic
stochastic systems, the states are private random variables and
it is necessary to incentivize agents to bid their states truthfully.
It does not appear to be feasible to construct mechanisms
that ensure the dominance of dynamic truth-telling for agents
comprised of general stochastic dynamic systems. Indeed we
conjecture that it is not possible to do so for general stochastic
dynamic agents.
Our contribution, on which we build further desirable results
as described in the sequel, is to show that for the special case
of Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) agents, where agents
have linear state equations, quadratic utility functions and
additive white Gaussian noise, a dynamic stochastic exten-
sion of the VCG mechanism does exist, based on a careful
construction of a sequence of layered payments over time.
We propose a modified layered mechanism for payments that
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2decouples the intertemporal effect of current bids on future
payoffs, and prove that truth-telling of their dynamic states
is a dominant strategy for every agent, if system parameters
are known and agents are rational. “Rational” means that an
agent will adopt a dominant strategy if it is the unique one,
and it will act on the basis that it and others will do so at
future times. In fact the mechanism achieves subgame perfect
dominance of truth-telling.
An important example of a problem needing such optimal
dynamic coordination of stochastic agents arises in the ISO
problem of power systems. Renewable energy resources such
as solar/wind are stochastic and dynamic in nature, as are
consumptions by loads which are influenced by factors such as
local temperatures and thermal inertias of facilities. In general,
agents may have different approaches to responding to the
prices set by the ISO. If each agent acts as a price taker, i.e.,
it honestly discloses its energy consumption/production at the
announced prices, a competitive equilibrium would be reached
among agents. However, if agents are price anticipators, then
it is critical for the ISO to design a market mechanism that is
strategy-proof (i.e., incentive compatible). The challenge for
the ISO is to determine a bidding scheme between agents
(producers and consumers) and the ISO that maximizes social
welfare, while taking into account the stochastic dynamic
models of agents.
Currently, the ISO solicits bids from generators and Load
Serving Entities (LSEs) and operates two markets: a day-ahead
market and a real-time market. The day-ahead market lets
market participants commit to buy or sell wholesale electricity
one day before the operating day, to satisfy energy demand
bids and to ensure adequate scheduling of resources to meet
the next day’s anticipated load. The real-time market lets
market participants buy and sell wholesale electricity during
the course of the operating day to balance the differences
between the already pledged day-ahead commitments and the
actual real-time demand and production [4]. Our layered VCG
mechanism fits perfectly in the real-time market, as we will
see in the sequel.
However, there is also a potential fatal downside for the
VCG mechanism: in general, the sum of total payments
collected by the ISO is non-positive, i.e., there is a budget
deficit. In fact, when agents have quadratic utility functions,
the total payments collected from consumers is indeed not
enough to cover the total payments to the suppliers. In effect,
in order to force agents to reveal their true utility functions, the
ISO will need to subsidize the market. In this paper we will
also propose a solution to this problem. The VCG payment
charges each agent i the difference between social welfare of
others if agent i is absent and social welfare of others when
agent i is present. We exhibit a solution that ensures there is
no budget deficit. It consists of inflating the first term above
in all of the agents’ VCG payments by a constant factor c,
leading to a Scaled VCG (SVCG) mechanism.
There are however two additional issues to be addressed
when proposing such a scheme. The first concerns the issue
of individual rationality. The net utility that an agent obtains
is the utility of energy consumption minus the amount it
pays. The magnitude of the scaling factor c is important; if
the constant number c is chosen to be too large, an agent
may simply opt out of the whole process, with a net utility
of zero obtained from generating/consuming no power and
collecting/making no payments, and not even join the market
which could result in a negative net utility. That is, the scheme
is not individually rational. The second issue concerns whether
the payment is Lagrange optimal for each agent. Lagrange
optimality means that the price that would manifest and the
payments that would occur if all agents were truth tellers.
The concern is that if a customer participates, the price it
pays/receives need not be Lagrange optimal.
We show that there is indeed a systematic way to choose
the scaling factor number c such that there is no budget
deficit for the ISO, while at the same time guaranteeing
that producers and consumers will actively participate in the
market. The factor c can be chosen in a way such that the
distortion between the VCG payment and Lagrange payment
is minimized in the worst case scenario. We argue that based
on historic knowledge of the market, the ISO may be able to
choose such a c that does not depend on any agent?s tactical
announcement.
Moreover, under a “market power balance condition”, which
essentially requires that no agent is too negligible or too pow-
erful, then asymptotically, as the number of agents increases,
the Scaled VCG payments converge to the Lagrange optimal
payments. This result provides an economic justification for
Load Serving Entities, which aggregate a large number of
small consumers into one reasonable sized consumer, as being
required to achieve social welfare optimality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, a survey of related works is presented. Section III sets
the stage for the dynamic stochastic case by providing a
description of the classic VCG framework for the static and
dynamic deterministic problems. It also introduces the Scaled
VCG mechanism for individual rationality and budget balance.
Section IV presents the difficulties in designing a mechanism
that ensures dominance of truth telling when agents are general
stochastic dynamic systems. Section V presents the layered
mechanism for LQG systems. It shows how intertemporal
decoupling is achieved, and proves subgame perfect domi-
nance of truth telling. It also shows that the budget balance
and individual rationality properties of the scaling mechanism
carry over from the deterministic case. Section VI shows how
the mechanism also applies when the noises are not Gaussian
to achieve optimality in the class of linear feedback strategies.
Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
In recent years, several works have explored issues arising
in dynamic mechanism design. In order to achieve ex post
incentive compatibility, Bergemann and Valimaki [5] propose
a generalization of the VCG mechanism based on the marginal
contribution of each agent and show that ex post participation
constraints are satisfied under some conditions. Athey and
Segal [6] consider an extension of the d’Aspremont-Gerard-
Varet (AGV) mechanism [7] to design a budget balanced
dynamic incentive compatible mechanism. Pavan et al. [8]
3derives first-order conditions under which incentive compat-
ibility is guaranteed by generalizing Mirrlees’s [9] envelope
formula of static mechanisms. Cavallo et al. [10] considers a
dynamic Markovian model and derives a sequence of Groves-
like payments which achieves Markov perfect equilibrium.
Bapna and Weber [11] solves a sequential allocation problem
by formulating it as a multi-armed bandit problem. Parkes
and Singh [12] and Friedman and Parkes [13] consider an
environment with randomly arriving and departing agents and
propose a “delayed” VCG mechanism to guarantee interim
incentive compatibility. Besanko et al. [14] and Battaglini et
al. [15] characterize the optimal infinite-horizon mechanism
for an agent modeled as a Markov process, with Besanko con-
sidering a linear AR(1) process over a continuum of states, and
Battaglini focusing on a two-state Markov chain. Bergemann
and Pavan [16] have an excellent survey on recent research in
dynamic mechanism design. A more recent survey paper by
Bergemann and Valimaki [17] further discusses the dynamic
mechanism design with risk-averse agents and the relationship
between dynamic mechanism and optimal contracts.
In order to capture strategic interactions between the ISO
and market participants, game theory and mechanism design
has been proposed in many recent papers. Sessa et al. [18]
studies the VCG mechanism for electricity markets and de-
rives conditions to ensure collusion and shill bidding are not
profitable. Okajima et al. [19] propose a VCG-based mech-
anism that guarantees incentive compatibility and individual
rationality for day-ahead market with equality and inequality
constraints. Xu et al. [20] shows that the VCG mechanism
always results in higher per-unit electricity prices than the lo-
cational marginal price (LMP) mechanism under any given set
of reported supply curves, and that the difference between the
per-unit prices resulting from the two mechanisms is negligibly
small. Bistarelli et al. [21] derives a VCG-based mechanism to
drive users in shifting energy consumption during peak hours.
In Samadi et al. [22], it is proposed that utility companies use
VCG mechanism to collect private information of electricity
users to optimize the energy consumption schedule.
There are also some related works aiming at achieving bud-
get balance for VCG mechanism. Moulin et al. [23] discusses
the trade-off between budget balance and efficiency of the
mechanism. Cavallo [24] uses domain information regarding
agent valuation spaces to achieve redistribution of much of the
required transfer payments back among the agents. Similarly,
Thirumulanathan et al. [25] propose a mechanism that is
efficient and comes close to budget balance by returning
much of the payments back to the agents in the form of
rebates. In [26], an enhanced (Arrow-dAspremont-Gerard-
Varet) AGV mechanism is proposed to tackle the problem of
budget balance in demand side management.
The problem of how to conduct bidding to achieve social
welfare optimality in stochastic dynamic systems is examined
in [27]. It assumes that all agents are price-takers.
A preliminary announcement of some of these results was
presented in the conference paper [28]. The layered payment
structure for LQG systems is mentioned there, and incentive
compatibility results are presented without proofs. The present
paper contains the complete proof of incentive compatibility,
and further introduces the Scaled VCG mechanism for budget
balance, individual rationality, and Lagrange optimality.
To our knowledge, there does not appear to be any result
that ensures dominance of dynamic truth-telling for agents
comprised of LQG systems, let alone ensuring no budget
deficit for the ISO, and individual rationality for all agents.
III. STATIC AND DYNAMIC DETERMINISTIC SYSTEMS
We begin with the simpler static deterministic case.
A. Static Deterministic Systems
Suppose there are N agents, each having a utility function
Fi(ui), where ui is the amount of energy produced/consumed
by agent i, with ui ≤ 0 for a producer and ui ≥ 0
for a consumer. The utility Fi(ui) of the i-th agent de-
pends only on its own consumption/generation ui. Let u :=
(u1, ..., uN )
T , u−i := (u1, ..., ui−1, ui+1, ..., uN )T , and let
F := (F1, . . . , Fn). We will occasionally abuse notation
and write Fi(u) with the implicit understanding that it only
depends on the i-th component ui of u. The total energy
generated must equal to the total consumed, i.e.,
∑
i ui = 0.
The ISO wishes to maximize the social welfare,
∑
i Fi(ui).
Hence it seeks to solve the following optimization problem and
assign the resulting generations/consumptions to the agents:
max
u
Fi(ui), (1)
subject to ∑
i
ui = 0. (1a)
We will consider the case where the ISO does not know
the individual utility functions of the agents. In that case, if
it asks them to disclose their utility functions, they may lie in
order to obtain a better allocation. A solution to this problem
of “truth-telling” is provided by the VCG mechanism which
asks each agent to bid its utility function. Let us denote agent
i’s bid by Fˆi. The agent can lie, so Fˆi may not be equal to
Fi. We denote Fˆ := (Fˆ1, . . . Fˆn). After obtaining the bids, the
ISO calculates u∗(Fˆ ) as the optimal solution to the following
problem:
max
u
∑
i
Fˆi(ui), subject to (1a)
Each agent is then assigned to produce/consume u∗i (Fˆ ),
accruing a utility Fi
(
u∗i
(
Fˆ
))
. Following the rule that it had
announced a priori before receiving the bids, the ISO collects
a payment pi(Fˆ ) from agent i, defined as:
pi(Fˆ ) :=
∑
j 6=i
Fˆj(u
(i))−
∑
j 6=i
Fˆj(u
∗(Fˆ )),
where u(i) is defined as the optimal solution to the following
problem:
max
u−i
∑
j 6=i
Fˆj(uj)
subject to ∑
j 6=i
uj = 0.
4We can see that pi above is the cost to the rest of the agents
due to agent i’s presence, which leads agent i to internalize
the social externality.
The VCG mechanism is a special case of the Groves
mechanism [2], where payment pi is defined as:
pi(Fˆ ) := hi(Fˆ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
Fˆj(u
∗(Fˆ )),
where hi is any arbitrary function of Fˆ−i :=
(Fˆ1, .., Fˆi−1, Fˆi+1, ..., FˆN ).
We define the “net utility” of an agent as the utility derived
by it minus its payment. Truth-telling is a dominant strategy
in the Groves mechanism [2], by which is meant that its net
utility is maximized by its telling the truth, regardless of what
the other agents bid:
Fi(u
∗(F¯ ))− pi(F¯ ) ≥Fi(u∗(Fˆ ))− pi(Fˆ ), for all Fˆ−i,
where F¯ := (Fˆ1, Fˆ2, . . . , Fˆi−1, Fi, Fˆi+1, . . . , FˆN ).
Definition 1. A mechanism is incentive compatible (IC) if
truth-telling is a dominant strategy for every agent.
One should note that an agent may not necessarily tell
the truth even if truth-telling is dominant since there may be
another strategy that is also dominant. We will assume that
every agent is “rational,” in that if its dominant strategy is
unique, then an agent will indeed tell the truth.
Definition 2. We call a mechanism efficient (EF) if the result-
ing allocation u∗ maximizes the social welfare
∑
i Fi(ui).
The VCG mechanism is IC, and when the dominant strategy
is unique, it is also EF.
In addition to realizing maximum social welfare, there are
two more important properties that are sought in a solution.
Definition 3. A mechanism is individually rational (IR) if
agents will choose to actively participate in the mechanism,
which they will only do if they are guaranteed to gain a
nonnegative net utility by participating, that is, Fi(u∗i )−pi ≥ 0
(because, by abstaining, an agent could always realize a net
utility of zero).
Definition 4. A mechanism satisfies budget balance (BB) if
the total payment made by agents is nonnegative:
∑
i pi ≥ 0.
(We use the descriptor “budget balance” if the ISO does not
have to provide a subsidy, rather than strictly requiring that
the total payments are exactly zero).
The VCG mechanism, in general, does not satisfy BB. In
fact, Green and Laffont [3] show that no mechanism can
satisfy all four properties –IC, EF, IR & BB– at the same
time.
If the ISO knew the true utility functions of all the agents, it
could solve the social welfare problem in a centralized manner:
calculate the Lagrange multiplier λ∗ (price) for the constraint
(1a), and collect a payment equal to λ∗u∗i from agent i. We
call this the Lagrange payment:
Definition 5. Suppose the optimal solution (λ∗, u∗) to (1) is
unique. We say that a mechanism is Lagrange Optimal if the
payment pi collected from agent i is equal to λ∗u∗i .
We will show in the sequel that while there is no mechanism
that satisfies all four properties (IC, EF, IR and BB) in general,
there does exist such a mechanism under a certain “market
power balance” condition.
In order to satisfy IC, EF, IR and BB at the same time,
we inflate the first term in the standard VCG mechanism by
a constant factor c:
pi(Fˆ ) = c ·
∑
j 6=i
Fˆj(u
(i))−
∑
j 6=i
Fˆj(u
∗). (2)
We call the VCG mechanism with the above payment structure
as a Scaled VCG (SVCG) mechanism, and c as the scaling
factor. To achieve BB and IR, one could choose c as a function
of the bids Fˆi, which unfortunately would cease to guarantee
incentive compatibility since the first term in (2) is not allowed
to be dependent on Fˆi in the Groves mechanism.
We will show below that there is a range of values of c that
can ensure BB under a certain market power balance condition,
and argue that through its long-term operation, the ISO may
be able to learn at least a subset of this range. Our presumptive
argument rests on the repetitive nature of this problem which
is played out every day, allowing the ISO to be able to tune
c to avoid a net subsidy. Based on this experience, the ISO
could choose a c for which BB and IR hold at the same time.
Theorem 1. Let u∗ be the optimal solution to (1) and suppose
that u∗ is unique. We will also suppose that u(i) is the unique
optimal solution to:
max
∑
j 6=i
Fj(uj), subject to
∑
j 6=i
uj = 0.
Let Hi :=
∑
j 6=i Fj(u
(i)), and let Hmax := maxiHi. Let
Ftotal =
∑
j Fj(u
∗). If Ftotal > 0, Hi > 0 for all i, and the
following Market Power Balance (MPB) condition holds:
(N − 1)Hmax ≤
∑
i
Hi, (3)
then there exists an interval [c, c¯] such that for any c in this
interval, the SVCG mechanism satisfies IC, EF, BB and IR at
the same time.
Proof. With c chosen as a constant, the SVCG mechanism
is within the Groves class and thus satisfies IC and EF. To
achieve budget balance, we need∑
i
pi = c
∑
i
Hi − (N − 1)Ftotal ≥ 0,
or equivalently, we need to have,
c ≥ (N − 1)Ftotal∑
iHi
.
To achieve individual rationality for agent i, we also need
Fi(u
∗)− pi = Fi(u∗)− c ·Hi +
∑
j 6=i
Fi(u
∗) ≥ 0,
or equivalently, we need to have,
c ≤ Ftotal
Hi
.
5Combining both the inequalities, we need to be able to choose
a c such that
(N − 1)Ftotal∑
iHi
≤ c ≤ Ftotal
Hmax
. (4)
Let c := (N−1)Ftotal∑
iHi
, and c¯ := FtotalHmax . Such a c exists if
(N − 1)Hmax ≤
∑
i
Hi, Ftotal > 0, Hi > 0, ∀i.
The critical condition in the above theorem is (3), which
states that no agent has significantly bigger or smaller market
power than others. Individual residential load customers gen-
erally have a much smaller scale compared to power plants,
and it is thus beneficial to form load aggregators or utility
companies at the consumer side, as suggested by the Market
Power Balance condition. This provides an economic justifi-
cation for the role of load aggregators or load serving entities
to guarantee the achievement of social welfare maximization.
In general, a SVCG mechanism is however not Lagrange
optimal. Within the feasible range [c, c¯], one may prefer to
choose a c that also achieves near-Lagrange optimality. This
could be formulated as the following MinMax problem:
min
c
max
i
|di(c)|, subject to (4),
where di(c) := λ∗u∗i − pi = λ∗u∗i − c · Hi +
∑
j 6=i Fj(u
∗).
This can be transformed to a linear program:
min Z
subject to
Z ≥ di(c), for all i,
Z ≥ −di(c), for all i, and (4).
Example 1. All agents have quadratic utility functions: Fi =
riu
2
i + siui. (r1, r2, r3, r4) = (−1,−1.1,−1.2,−1.1) and
(s1, s2, s3, s4) = (1, 1.2, 4, 5). The unique Lagrange optimal
solution is u∗ = (−0.86,−0.70, 0.53, 1.03), λ∗ = 2.73,
and from (4), 1.13 ≤ c ≤ 1.19. The optimal solution to
the MinMax problem is (c∗, Z∗) = (1.14, 0.22). Thus, by
choosing c = 1.14, the SVCG mechanism satisfies IC, EF, BB
and IR, and the maximum discrepancy between VCG payment
and Lagrange payments is 0.22.
In the MinMax problem, one can also replace di(c) by the
ratio di(c)/λ∗u∗i to normalize the nearness of the payment to
the Lagrange payment. It also can be written as an LP. Using
the above ratio, the optimal solution is (c∗, Z∗) = (1.18, 0.06),
showing that all agents pay/receive within 6% of their La-
grange optimal payment.
Next, we will revisit this problem from a different, asymp-
totic, point of view.
B. Static Deterministic Systems with Quadratic Costs
We consider N heterogeneous agents with quadratic costs
and show that SVCG payments converge to the Lagrange
payment as N increases. Let Fi(ui) = aiu2i + biui be the
quadratic utility function for agent i, whether supplier or
consumer. Denote by A = diag(a1, a2, ..., aN ) the diago-
nal matrix consisting of all the ai, B := [b1; ...; bN ] and
U = [u1; ...;uN ]. We suppose A < 0. The ISO needs to solve
the following problem:
max UTAU +BTU (5)
subject to
1TU = 0. (6)
where 1 is the all-one vector of proper size. The solution to
this problem is:
λ∗N = γ1TA−1B, (7)
U∗N =
1
2
A−1
(
λ∗N · 1−B) . (8)
where γ =
(
trace
(
A−1
))−1
= 1TA−11 and index N is used
to keep track of the population size. Note also that the optimal
social welfare is 14λ
21TA−11 = 14
(1TA−1B)2
1TA−11 .
Theorem 2. For the SVCG mechanism with quadratic utility
functions, if (ai, bi) satisfy the following:
1) a ≤ ai ≤ a¯ < 0, 0 < b ≤ bi ≤ b¯,
2) (N − 1)Hmax(N) ≤
∑
iHi(N), Ftotal(N) >
0, Hi(N) > 0, where the argument N denotes that the
corresponding quantity refers to the system with agents
1, 2, ...N ,
then the following holds:
1) There exists a cN satisfying:
(N − 1)Ftotal(N)∑
iHi(N)
≤ c ≤ Ftotal(N)
Hmax(N)
.
Moreover, any such cN satisfies limN→∞ cN = 1,
2) limN→∞(λ∗Nu∗Ni − pNi ) = 0, for all i.
Proof. It suffices to prove the result for the first agent.
Let A−1 = diag(a2, ..., aN ), B−1 = [b2; ...; bN ], 1−1 be
the all-one vector of dimension M + N − 1 and γ−1 =(
trace
(
A−1−1
))−1
.
Lemma 1. Let U∗ and W ∗ be the optimal solutions to the
problem consisting of all agents, and the problem excluding
the first agent, respectively. Then, as the number of agents
increases,
lim
N→∞
[
0(N−1)×1 IN−1
]
U∗ −W ∗ = O(1/N), (9)
where 0(N−1)×1 is the N − 1 dimensional column vector of
zeroes, and IN−1 is the N − 1 dimensional identity matrix.
Proof. From (7) and (8),[
0 I
]
U∗ −W ∗ =
=
1
2
[
0 I
] [a−11 0
0 A−1−1
](
γ · [1 1T−1] [a−11 00 A−1−1
] [
b1
B−1
]
[
1
1−1
]
−
[
b1
B−1
])
− 1
2
A−1−1
(
γ−11T−1A
−1
−1B−11−1 −B−1
)
=
1
2
(
γa−11 b1 + (γ − γ−1) 1T−1A−1−1B−1
)
A−1−11−1.
6Since a ≤ ai ≤ a¯ < 0, γ = Θ(1/N), and γ < 0, a¯baN ≤
γa−11 b1 ≤ ab¯a¯N , a¯
2
−aN(N−1) ≤ γ − γ−1 ≤ a
2
−a¯N(N−1) ,
a2b¯
−a¯2N ≤
(γ − γ−1)1T−1A−1−1B−1 ≤ a¯
2b
−a2N . Therefore,
lim
N→∞
[
0 I
]
U∗ −W ∗ = 0.
Let
[
0 I
]
U∗ = V ∗. From Lemma 1, we know that v∗i −
w∗i = O(
1
N ) where vi and wi is the i-th component of V
∗
and W ∗, respectively. Hence,
Ftotal
H1
=
a1u
∗2
1 + b1u
∗
1 +
∑N
i=2(aiv
∗2
i + biv
∗
i )∑N
i=2(aiw
∗2
i + biw
∗
i )
=
a1u
∗2
1 + b1u
∗
1 +
∑N
i=2
(
aiw
∗2
i + biw
∗
i +G1
)∑N
i=2(aiw
∗2
i + biw
∗
i )
,
where G1 = (2aiw∗i + bi)O(
1
N ) + aiO(
1
N2 ). From
equations (7) and (8), we know that w∗i = Θ(1).
Therefore, lim
N→∞
(Ftotal/H1) = 1. Similarly, for all other i,
lim
N→∞
(Ftotal/Hi) = 1.
Therefore, lim
N→∞
c¯N = 1.
Let Hmin = miniHi. Since
(N−1)Ftotal
NHmax
≤ cN ≤
(N−1)Ftotal
NHmin
, limN→∞ cN = 1. Consequently,
lim
N→∞
cN = 1.
From Lemma 1, we have W ∗ − V ∗ =
− 12
(
γa−11 b1 + (γ − γ−1) ξ
)
A−1−11−1, where ξ =
1T−1A
−1
−1B−1 and ξ = Θ(N). The payment by Agent 1
is:
pN1 = U
∗T
−1A−1U
∗
−1 +B
T
−1U
∗
−1 − V ∗TA−1V ∗ −BT−1V ∗
= (U∗−1 + V
∗)TA−1(U∗−1 − V ∗) +BT−1(U∗−1 − V ∗).
The difference between Lagrange payment and VCG payment
is:
λ∗Nu∗N1 − pN1
=
1
2a1
γ(a−11 b1 + ξ)
(
γ
(
a−11 b1 + ξ
)− b1)− pN1
=
1
2a1
γ2(a−11 b1 + ξ)
2 − b1
2a1
γ(a−11 b1 + ξ)
−
[
1
2
[(
γa−11 b1 + (γ + γ−1) ξ
)
1T−1 − 2BT−1
]
A−1−1A−1
+BT−1
]
· −1
2
(
γa−11 b−1 + (γ − γ−1) ξ
)
A−1−11−1
=
1
2a1
γ2(a−11 b1 + ξ)
2 − b1
2a1
γ(a−11 b1 + ξ)
+
1
4γ−1
[
γ2a−21 b
2
1 + 2a
−1
1 b1γ
2ξ + (γ2 − γ−2−1)ξ2
]
.
Since γ = Θ( 1N ),
lim
N→∞
(
λ∗Nu∗N1 − pN1
)
= lim
N→∞
[
γ2ξ2
2a1
− b1γξ
2a1
+
b1γ
2ξ
2a1γ−1
+
(γ2 − γ2−1)ξ2
4γ−1
]
= lim
N→∞
[
ξ2
4
(
2γ2
a1
+
γ2 − γ2−1
γ−1
)− b1γξ
2a1
(1− γ
γ−1
)
]
= lim
N→∞
[
ξ2
4
(
γ2
a1
+ γ − γ−1)
]
.
By calculation, we have
γ2
a1
+ γ − γ−1 = −1
a21
[
1
(
∑N
i=1
1
ai
)2(
∑N
j=2
1
aj
)
]
= O(
1
N3
).
Therefore,
lim
N→∞
(
λ∗Nu∗N1 − pN1
)
= 0.
C. Dynamic Deterministic Systems
The above VCG scheme can be extended to the important
case of deterministic dynamic systems. One can consider the
entire sequence of actions taken by an agent as a vector action.
That is, one can view the problem as an open-loop control
problem, where the entire decision on the sequence of controls
to be employed is taken at the initial time, and so treatable as
a static problem.
For agent i, let Fi(xi(t), ui(t)) be the one-step utility
function at time t. Suppose that the state of agent i evolves
as:
xi(t+ 1) = gi(xi(t), ui(t)). (10)
The ISO asks each agent i to bid its one-step utility functions,
state equations and initial condition. Denote the one-step
utility function bids made by agent i by {Fˆi(xi(t), ui(t)), t =
0, 1, . . . , T − 1}, its state equation bids by {gˆi, t =
0, 1, . . . , T −1}, and its initial condition bid by xˆi,0. The ISO
then calculates (x∗i (t), u
∗
i (t)) as the optimal solution, assumed
to be unique, to the following utility maximization problem:
max
N∑
i=1
T−1∑
t=0
Fˆi(xi(t), ui(t))
subject to
xi(t+ 1) = gˆi(xi(t), ui(t)), for ∀i and ∀t,
N∑
i=1
ui(t) = 0, for ∀t, (11)
xi(0) = xˆi,0, for ∀i. (12)
We denote this problem as (Fˆ , gˆ, xˆ0). We can extend the
notion of VCG payment pi to the deterministic dynamic
system as follow. Let
pi :=
∑
j 6=i
T−1∑
t=0
Fˆj(x
(i)
j (t), u
(i)
j (t))−
∑
j 6=i
T−1∑
t=0
Fˆj(x
∗
j (t), u
∗
j (t)).
7Here (x(i)i (t), u
(i)
i (t)) is the optimal solution to the following
problem, which is assumed to be unique:
max
∑
j 6=i
T−1∑
t=0
Fˆj(xj(t), uj(t))
subject to
xj(t+ 1) = gˆj(xj(t), uj(t)), for j 6= i and ∀t,∑
j 6=i
uj(t) = 0, for ∀t,
xj(0) = xˆj,0, for j 6= i.
More generally, we can consider a Groves payment pi defined
as:
pi := hi,t(Fˆ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
T−1∑
t=0
Fˆj(x
∗
j (t), u
∗
j (t)),
where hi,t is any arbitrary function.
Theorem 3. Truth-telling of utility function, state dynamics
and initial condition (Fˆi ≡ Fi, gˆi ≡ gi and xˆi,0 = xi,0) is
a dominant strategy equilibrium under the Groves mechanism
for a dynamic system.
Proof. Let Fˆ := (Fˆ1, ..., Fˆi, ..., FˆN ), gˆ := (gˆ1..., gˆi, ..., gˆN ),
and xˆ0 := (xˆ1,0, ..., xˆi,0, ..., xˆN,0). Suppose agent
i announces the true one-step utility function Fi,
true state dynamics gi, and true initial condition
xi,0. Let F¯ := (Fˆ1, ...Fˆi−1, Fi, Fˆi+1, ..., FˆN ),
g¯ := (gˆ1, ...gˆi−1, gi, gˆi+1, ..., gˆN ), and x¯0 :=
(xˆ1,0, ...xˆi−1,0, xi,0, xˆi+1,0, ..., xˆN,0). Let (x¯∗i (t), u¯
∗
i (t))
be what ISO assigns and pi(F¯ , g¯, x¯0) be what ISO charges
when (F¯ , g¯, x¯0) is announced by agents. Let (x∗i (t), u
∗
i (t))
be what ISO assigns, and pi(Fˆ , gˆ, xˆ0) be what ISO
charges when (Fˆ , gˆ, xˆ0) is announced by agents. Define
F¯ (xi(t), ui(t)) :=
∑
i F¯i(xi(t), ui(t)).
For agent i, the difference between net utility resulting from
announcing (Fi, gi, xi,0) and (Fˆi, gˆi, xˆi,0) is[∑
t
Fi(x¯
∗
i (t), u¯
∗
i (t))− pi(F¯ , g¯, x¯0)
]
−
[∑
t
Fi(x
∗
i (t), u
∗
i (t))
− pi(Fˆ , gˆ, xˆ0)
]
=
∑
t
Fi(x¯
∗
i (t), u¯
∗
i (t))− hi,t(F¯−i) +
∑
j 6=i
∑
t
Fˆj(x¯
∗
i (t), u¯
∗
i (t))
−
∑
t
Fi(x
∗
i (t), u
∗
i (t)) + hi,t(Fˆ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
∑
t
Fˆj(x
∗
i (t), u
∗
i (t))
=
∑
t
F¯ (x¯∗i (t), u¯
∗
i (t))−
∑
t
F¯ (x∗i (t), u
∗
i (t)) ≥ 0,
since (x¯∗i (t), u¯
∗
i (t)) is the optimal solution to the problem
(F¯ , g¯, x¯0).
Consider now the Scaled VCG mechanism where the pay-
ment of agent i is
pi := c
∑
j 6=i
T−1∑
t=0
Fˆj(x
(i)
j (t), u
(i)
j (t))−
∑
j 6=i
T−1∑
t=0
Fˆj(x
∗
j (t), u
∗
j (t)).
As in the static case, we show below that there exists a range
of values c under which this Scaled VCG payment achieves
IC, EF, BB and IR at the same time.
Theorem 4. Let u∗(t) be the optimal solution to the following
problem:
max
∑
i
∑
t
Fi(xi(t), ui(t)), subject to (10), (11), (12),
and let u(i)(t) be the optimal solution to the following prob-
lem:
max
∑
j 6=i
∑
t
Fj(xj(t), uj(t)),
subject to
xj(t+ 1) = gj(xj(t), uj(t)), for j 6= i,∑
j 6=i
uj(t) = 0, for all t and xj(0) = xj,0 for j 6= i.
Let Hi :=
∑
j 6=i
∑
t Fj(x
(i)
j (t), u
(i)
j (t)), and let Hmax =
maxiHi. Let Ftotal :=
∑
t
∑
j Fj(x
∗
j (t), u
∗
j (t)). If Ftotal > 0,
Hi > 0 for all i, and MPB (3) condition holds, then there
exists an c and c¯, with c ≤ c¯ such that if the constant c is
chosen in the range [c, c¯], then the Scaled VCG mechanism
for the deterministic dynamic system satisfies IC, EF, BB and
IR at the same time.
As in the static case, we suppose that from experience, the
ISO can choose a value of c in this range, which does not
depend on the agents’ bids, to achieve BB and IR.
D. Deterministic Linear Systems with Quadratic Costs
As in the static case, the SVCG mechanism is asymp-
totically Lagrange optimal for linear systems with quadratic
costs as the number of agents goes to infinity, as shown
below. Consider Fi(xi(t), ui(t)) = qix2i (t) + riu
2
i (t) and
xi(t+ 1) = aixi(t) + biui(t). We suppose qi ≤ 0, and ri < 0.
Theorem 5. For the SVCG mechanism with quadratic utility
functions and linear state dynamics, if (ai, bi, pi, qi) satisfy
the following:
1) a ≤ |ai|≤ a¯, b ≤ |bi|≤ b¯, q ≤ qi ≤ q¯ < 0 and r ≤ ri ≤
r¯ < 0,
2) (N − 1)Hmax(N) ≤
∑
iHi(N), Ftotal(N) > 0 and
Hi(N) > 0 for all i.
Then the following hold:
1) There exist cN ≤ c¯N such that for any cN ∈ [cN , c¯N ],
BB and IR hold. Moreover, limN→∞ cN = 1,
2) limN→∞
(∑
t
(
λ∗N (t)uNi (t)
)− pNi ) = 0, for all i.
Proof. Let X(t) = (x1(t), x2(t), ..., xN (t))T , U(t) =
(u1(t), u2(t), ..., uN (t))
T , A = diag(a1, a2, ..., aN ), B =
diag(b1, b2, ..., bN ), Q = diag(q1, q2, ..., qN ), and R =
diag(r1, r2, ..., rN ). The utility maximization problem can be
rewritten as the following Linear-Quadratic (LQ) problem:
max
T−1∑
t=0
XT (t)QX(t) + UT (t)RU(t) (13)
8subject to
X(t+ 1) = AX(t) +BU(t), (14)
1TU(t) = 0, for ∀t.
By substituting (14) into (13), and using the fact that open-
loop optimal control is equivalent to the closed-loop optimal
solution to LQ problem, we have the following equivalent
augmented LQ problem:
max ΩT (t)WΩ(t) + V TΩ(t) (15)
subject to
Y TΩ(t) = 0. (16)
where Ω := (U1;U2; ...;UN ), and Ui =
(ui(0);ui(1); ...;ui(T − 1)), W and V are formed
by multiplication and addition of A,B,Q,R and
Y := [IT ; IT ; ...; IT ] with N T -dimensional identity
matrix IT . More specifically, W can be partitioned into
diagonal blocks: W = diag(W1, ...,WN ), where each block
Wi is a T × T square matrix consisting of multiplication and
addition of ai, bi, qi, ri.
Noting that the optimization problem (15) and (16) is in the
same form as (5) and (6), the unique Lagrange multiplier λ is
calculated as λ∗ = ΓY TW−1V , where Γ = (Y TW−1Y )−1.
The key to the proof of Theorem 2 is to show that γ is
Θ(1/N). (Note that f(N) = Ω(g(N)) if f(N) = O(g(N))
as well as g(N) = Ω(f(N))). Similarly, by expanding
Γ = (W−11 + W
−1
2 + ... + W
−1
N )
−1 and applying bounded
inverse theorem [29], ||Γ|| is also Θ(1/N) since ai, bi, qi, ri
are all uniformly bounded, respectively.
Let Ω∗ be the optimal solution to problem (15) and (16)
consisting of all agents and let Ψ∗ be the optimal solution to
the problem excluding the first agent. By replacing A, B and
1 with W , V and Y respectively, we have
lim
N→∞
[
0(N−1)T×T I(N−1)T
]
Ω∗ −Ψ∗ = 0.
Let
[
0 I
]
Ω∗ = Φ∗. From above, we know that Φ∗i −Ψ∗i =
O( 1N )1 where Φi and Ψi is the i-th T -length component of
Φ∗ and Ψ∗, respectively. Hence,
Ftotal
H1
=
U∗T1 W1U
∗
1 + V
T
1 U
∗
1 +
∑N
i=2(Φ
∗T
i WiΦ
∗
i + V
T
i Φ
∗
i )∑N
i=2(Ψ
∗T
i WiΨ
∗
i + V
T
i Ψ
∗
i )
=
U∗T1 W1U
∗
1 + V
T
1 U
∗
1 +
∑N
i=2(Ψ
∗T
i WiΨ
∗
i + V
T
i Ψ
∗
i +G1)∑N
i=2(Ψ
∗T
i WiΨ
∗
i + V
T
i Ψ
∗
i )
where G1 = (2Ψ∗Ti Wi1+V
T
i 1)O(
1
N )+1
TWi1·O( 1N2 ). Since
Ψ∗i = Θ(1)1, we have lim
N→∞
(
FNtotal/H
N
1
)
= 1. Similarly, for
all other i, lim
N→∞
(
FNtotal/H
N
i
)
= 1.
Therefore, lim
N→∞
c¯N = 1.
Let Hmin = miniHi. Since
(N−1)Ftotal
NHmax
≤ cN ≤
(N−1)Ftotal
NHmin
, limN→∞ cN = 1. Consequently,
lim
N→∞
cN = 1.
From Lemma 1, we have,
Ψ∗ − Φ∗ = −1
2
W−1−1 Y−1(ΓW
−1
−1 V−1 + (Γ− Γ−1)Ξ),
where W−1, V−1 are formed by removing W1 and V1 from
W and V , respectively. Y−1 = [IT ; ...; IT ] with (N − 1) T -
dimensional identity matrix. Ξ = Y −1−1 W
−1
−1 V−1 and Ξ =
O(N)1. Similarly as in Theorem 2, we have,
lim
N→∞
(
λ∗TU∗1 − pN1
)
= lim
N→∞
[
1
2
(V T1 W
−1
1 + Ξ
T )ΓT [W−11 Γ(W
−1
1 V1 + Ξ)
−W−11 V1]−
[
1
2
[ (
ΓW−1−1 V−1 + (Γ + Γ−1)Ξ
)T
Y T−1 − 2V−1
]T
W−1−1W−1 + V
T
−1
]
· −1
2
W−1−1 Y−1(ΓW
−1
−1 V−1 + (Γ− Γ−1)Ξ)
]
= lim
N→∞
(
1
4
ΞT
(
ΓTW−11 Γ + Γ− Γ−1
)
Ξ
)
It is straightforward to see that,
ΓTW−11 Γ + Γ− Γ−1
=−
(
N∑
i=1
W−1i
)−1
W−11
(
N∑
i=1
W−1i
)−1
W−11
(
N∑
i=2
W−1i
)−1
=O(
1
N3
).
Consequently,
lim
N→∞
(
λ∗TU∗i − pNi
)
= 0.
IV. DYNAMIC STOCHASTIC VCG
In the previous section, we have shown that the VCG
mechanism can be naturally extended to deterministic dynamic
systems by employing an open-loop solution. A new compli-
cation arises when agents are stochastic dynamic systems. The
states of agents evolve randomly, and so we need to consider
closed-loop control laws for each agent. Such closed-loop
control laws depend on the observations of the agents, which
are generally private random variables. Hence the problem
therefore arises of ensuring that each agent reveals its “true”
observation at each and every time instant. (Other unknowns
such as the system dynamic equations, the noise statistics,
and the utility functions, can be considered as part of the first
observation).
However, a fundamental difficulty arises with respect to
ensuring social welfare optimality of the stochastic dynamic
system. Since an agent’s intertemporal payoff depends on the
future payments and allocations in a dynamic game, the agent’s
current bid need not maximize its current payoff. What’s more,
since dishonest bids distort current and future allocations in
different ways, an agent’s optimal bid will depend on others’
bids.
To see this, it is sufficient to consider the case where all
system parameters – system dynamics, noise statistics, and
utility functions – are known to all agents, and where each
agent can completely observe its own private state xi(t), with
the only complication being that it cannot observe the states of
other agents. For agent i, let wi(t) be the discrete-time noise
process affecting state xi(t) via the state evolution equation:
xi(t+ 1) = gi(xi(t), ui(t), wi(t)),
9where xi(0) is independent of wi. The uncertainties of all the
agents are independent. The ISO aims to maximize the social
welfare:
max E
N∑
i=1
T−1∑
t=0
Fi(xi(t), ui(t))
subject to
N∑
i=1
ui(t) = 0, for ∀t. (17)
We will assume that Fi, gi and the distributions of the
uncertainties are known to the ISO. We comment in the sequel
on the further difficulty that arises when they are unknown.
We focus on the issue of truth-telling by the agents of their
states.
Suppose that agents bid their states xi(t) as xˆi(t). A
straightforward extension of the static Groves mechanism,
which we will see does not work, would be to collect a
payment pi(t) at time t from agent i, defined as
pi(t)
=hi(Xˆ−i(t))− E
∑
j 6=i
T−1∑
τ=t
[
Fj(xˆj(τ), u
∗
j (τ)) | X(t) = Xˆ(t)
]
,
where xˆi(t) is what agent i bids for his state at time t,
Xˆ−i(t) = [xˆ1(t), ..., xˆi−1(t), xˆi+1(t), ..., xˆN (t)]T , and u∗j (t)
is the optimal solution to the following problem:
max E
N∑
j=1
T−1∑
τ=t
[
Fj(xˆj(τ), u
∗
j (τ)) | X(t) = Xˆ(t)
]
subject to
xj(τ + 1) = gj(xj(τ), uj(τ), wj(τ)),
N∑
j=1
uj(τ) = 0, for t ≤ τ ≤ T − 1, (18)
Xˆ(τ) = [xˆ1(τ), ..., xˆN (τ)]
T .
It is easy to verify that truth-telling of states by all agents
forms a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium since truth-telling
of xi(t) for agent i is a best response given that all other
agents bid truthfully for all τ ≥ t.
However, truth-telling of states does not constitute a dom-
inant strategy because another agent j may bid xˆj(t + 1) at
time t+ 1 truthfully, but lie about the state xj(t) at time t in
order to obtain a preferable state at the next time t+ 1. More
specifically, if we assume all agents will bid truthfully from
t + 1 onward, then at time t, if agent j bids some untruthful
xˆj(t), truth-telling of state for agent i will be an optimal
strategy only if agent j continues to bid “an untruthful but
consistent” xˆj(t) which stems from his untruthful bid xˆj(t).
By “consistent” we mean the state that would result from the
untruthful xˆj(t) but with the truthful state noise wj(t). In other
word, agent i’s will bid truthfully only if agent j “consistently”
lies about his state, which is not guaranteed using the above
payment scheme.
This additional complication precludes a dominant strategy
solution for general stochastic dynamic systems, even in the
completely observed case, and even when all system param-
eters, by which are meant the system dynamic equations, the
noise statistics, and the utility functions, are known to all
agents. We conjecture that there does not exist a dominant
strategy for each agent that ensures social welfare optimality
even in this special context, when agents are general stochastic
dynamic systems. All that one can possibly hope for in general
is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where truth telling by
an agent is optimal when all other agents are telling the truth.
We will show in the sequel that there is one important
exception: LQG agents.
V. LINEAR QUADRATIC GAUSSIAN SYSTEMS
We now show that while an incentive compatible strategy
presents fundamental challenges for general stochastic dy-
namic systems even when system parameters are known to all,
as noted above, there is a solution for LQG systems in both
the completely observed case case where each agent observes
its own private state, and in the partially observed case where
each agent observes a linear transformation its state corrupted
by white Gaussian noise. In fact, we show that one can then
even obtain the following stronger property:
Definition 6. We say that a mechanism attains a subgame
perfect dominant strategy equilibrium if, at every time t,
truth-telling by each agent of its remaining future private
observations is optimal with respective to the conditional
expectation of its remaining net utility, irrespective of the
strategies of other agents in the future.
We need to investigate the structure of LQG systems more
carefully. We begin by considering the completely observed
case. For agent i, let wi(t) ∼ N (0, σi) be the discrete-time
additive Gaussian white noise process affecting state xi(t) via:
xi(t+ 1) = aixi(t) + biui(t) + wi(t)),
where xi(0) ∼ N (0, ζi) and is independent of wi. Each agent
has a one-step utility function
Fi(xi(t), ui(t)) = qix
2
i (t) + riu
2
i (t).
We suppose that qi ≤ 0 and ri < 0. Let X(t) =
[x1(t), ..., xN (t)]
T , U(t) = [u1(t), ..., uN (t)]T and W (t) =
[w1(t), ..., wN (t)]
T . Let Q = diag(q1, ..., qN ) ≤ 0, R =
diag(r1, ..., rN ) < 0, A = diag(a1, ..., aN ), B =
diag(b1, ..., bN ), Σ = diag(σ1, ..., σN ) > 0 and Z =
diag(ζ1, ..., ζN ) > 0. We assume that the ISO knows the true
system parameters A, B, Q and R.
Let RSW :=
∑T−1
t=0 [X
T (t)QX(t) + UT (t)RU(t)] be the
random social welfare, i.e., the variable whose expectation is
the social welfare of the agents, and let SW := E[RSW ] de-
note the (expected) social welfare. The random social welfare
could also be called the “ex-post social welfare”, while SW
could be called the “ex ante social welfare.”
The ISO aims to maximize the social welfare:
max E
T−1∑
t=0
[
XT (t)QX(t) + UT (t)RU(t)
]
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subject to
X(t+ 1) = AX(t) +BU(t) +W (t),
1TU(t) = 0, for ∀t, (19)
X(0) ∼ N (0, Z),W ∼ N (0,Σ).
The key to obtaining subgame perfect dominance is to in-
troduce a “layered” payment structure which ensures incentive
compatibility for LQG systems. We begin by rewriting the
random social welfare, and thereby also the social welfare, in
terms more convenient for us. We will decompose the state
X(t) of the entire system comprised of all agents as:
X(t) :=
t∑
s=0
X(s, t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, (20)
where X(s, s) := W (s− 1) for s ≥ 1 and X(0, 0) := X(0).
Let
X(s, t) := AX(s, t−1)+BU(s, t−1), 0 ≤ s ≤ t−1, (21)
with U(s, t) yet to be specified. We suppose that U(t) can
also be decomposed as:
U(t) :=
t∑
s=0
U(s, t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. (22)
Then regardless of how the U(s, t)’s are chosen, as long as
the U(s, t)’s for 0 ≤ s ≤ t are indeed a decomposition of
U(t), i.e., (22) is satisfied, the random social welfare can be
written in terms of X(s, t)’s and U(s, t)’s as:
RSW =
T−1∑
s=0
Ls,
where Ls for s ≥ 1 is defined as:
Ls : =
T−1∑
t=s
[
XT (s, t)QX(s, t) + UT (s, t)RU(s, t) (23)
+2
(
s−1∑
τ=0
X(τ, t)
)
QX(s, t) + 2
(
s−1∑
τ=0
U(τ, t)
)
RU(s, t)
]
,
and L0 is defined as:
L0 :=
T−1∑
t=0
[
XT (0, t)QX(0, t) + UT (0, t)RU(0, t)
]
.
Hence,
SW = E
T−1∑
s=0
Ls.
In the scheme to follow, the ISO will choose all U(s, t)’s
for future t’s at time s, based on the information it has at time
s. Hence X(s, t) is completely determined by W (s− 1), and
U(s, t) for s ≤ t ≤ T − 1. Indeed X(s, t) can be regarded as
the contribution to X(t) of these variables.
We now define the LQG ISO Mechanism. Instead of asking
agents to bid their state, we will consider a scheme where
agents will be asked to bid their state noises. At each stage s,
the ISO asks each agent i to bid its xi(s, s), defined as equal
to wi(s − 1). Let xˆi(s, s) be what the agent actually bids,
since it may not tell the truth. Based on their bids {xˆi(s, s)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ N}, the ISO solves the following problem:
max Ls
for the system
Xˆ(s, t) = AXˆ(s, t− 1) +BU(s, t− 1), for t > s,
with
Xˆ(s, s) = [xˆ1(s, s), ..., xˆN (s, s)]
T ,
subject to the constraint
1TU(s, t) = 0, for s ≤ t ≤ T − 1.
Here Xˆ(s, t) is the zero-noise state variable updates starting
from the “initial condition” Xˆ(s, s). Let U∗(s, t) denote the
optimal solution.
The interpretation is the following. Based on the bids,
Xˆ(s, s), which is supposedly a bid of W (s − 1), the ISO
calculates the trajectory of the linear systems from time s
onward, assuming zero state noise from that point on. It then
allocates consumptions/generations U(s, t) for future periods t
for the corresponding deterministic linear system, with balance
of consumption and production (19) at each time t. These can
be regarded as generation/consumption allocations taking into
account the consequences of the disturbance occurring at time
s. Thereby we are decomposing the behavior of the system
into separate effects caused by the state noise random variables
occurring at different times.
Next, the ISO collects a payment pi(s) from agent i at time
s as:
pi(s) := hi(Xˆ−i(s, s))−
∑
j 6=i
T−1∑
t=s
[
qj xˆ
2
j (s, t) + rju
∗2
j (s, t)
+2qj
(
s−1∑
τ=0
xˆj(τ, t)
)
xˆj(s, t) + 2rj
(
s−1∑
τ=0
uj(τ, t)
)
u∗j (s, t)
]
,
where Xˆ−i(s, s) = [xˆ1(s, s), ..., xˆi−1(s, s), xˆi+1(s, s), ...
, xˆN (s, s)]
T , and hi is any arbitrary function (as in the Groves
mechanism).
Before we prove incentive compatibility, we need to define
what is meant by “rationality” of an agent in a dynamic system
where each agent has to take actions at different times.
Definition 7. Rational Agents: We say agent i is rational at
time T − 1, if it adopts a dominant strategy whenever there
exists a unique dominant strategy. An agent i is rational at
time t if it adopts a dominant strategy at time t under the
assumption that all agents including itself are rational at times
t+1, t+2, ..., T−1, whenever there is a unique such dominant
strategy at time t.
A critical property of the LQ problem is that the “gain”
K(k) does not depend on the state. A key result needed to
show dominance of truth telling is to achieve ”intertemporal”
decoupling. In the case of the quadratic cost, this will be
achieved by showing the following Lemma in the sequel:
Lemma 2. (Intertemporal Decoupling for LQG Agents) Let
Hk be the history up to time k. Then, under the LQG ISO
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Mechanism, if system parameters Q ≤ 0, R < 0, A and B
are known, and agents are rational, then
E[X(k, t)|Hk−1] = 0, for k < t ≤ T − 1,
and
E[U(k, t)|Hk−1] = 0 for k < t ≤ T − 1.
The proof of this is provided as part of the following
overarching result.
Theorem 6. Truth-telling of state xˆi(s, s) for 0 ≤ s ≤ T − 1,
i.e., bidding xˆi(s, s) = wi(s − 1), is the unique dominant
strategy for each agent i under the LQG ISO Mechanism, if
system parameters Q ≤ 0, R < 0, A and B are known, and
agents are rational. The LQG ISO Mechanism achieves social
welfare optimization.
Proof. We show the result by backward induction. Let Agent
j, j 6= i bid xˆj(s, s) at time s. Given the bids xˆj(s, s) of
other agents, let Ji(s) be the net utility of agent i from time s
onward if it bids truthful xi(s, s), i.e., wi(s−1), and let Jˆi(s)
be the net utility if it bids possibly untruthful xˆi(s, s). Let
U∗(s, t) be the ISO’s assignments if agent i bids truthfully
and let Uˆ∗(s, t) be the ISO’s assignments if agent i bids
untruthfully.
We will first consider time T − 1, since we are employing
backward induction. Suppose that xi(s, T − 1) for 0 ≤ s ≤
T − 2 were the past bids, and ui(s, T − 1) for 0 ≤ s ≤ T − 2,
were those portions of the allocations for the future already
decided in the past. Our interest is on analyzing what should be
the current bid xi(T−1, T−1), and the consequent additional
allocation ui(T − 1, T − 1). Now
Ji(T − 1) = qix2i (T − 1) + riu2i (T − 1)− pi(T − 1)
= qi
[
xi(T − 1, T − 1) +
T−2∑
s=0
xi(s, T − 1)
]2
+ ri
[
u∗i (T − 1, T − 1) +
T−2∑
s=0
ui(s, T − 1)
]2
− pi(T − 1).
Now xi(s, T − 1) for 0 ≤ s ≤ T − 2 depend only on previous
bids xi(s, s), and thus those terms can be treated as constants.
In addition, the hi term depends only on other agents’ bids.
As a consequence, when comparing Ji(T −1) with Jˆi(T −1),
one can just regard hi ≡ 0. Hence we can simply write
Ji(T − 1) = qix2i (T − 1, T − 1) + riu∗2i (T − 1, T − 1)
+ 2qi
(
T−2∑
s=0
xi(s, T − 1)
)
xi(T − 1, T − 1)
+ 2ri
(
T−2∑
s=0
ui(s, T − 1)
)
u∗i (T − 1, T − 1)
+
∑
j 6=i
[
qj xˆ
2
j (T − 1, T − 1) + rju∗2j (T − 1, T − 1)
+ 2qj
(
T−2∑
τ=0
xˆj(τ, T − 1)
)
xˆj(T − 1, T − 1)
+ 2rj
(
T−2∑
τ=0
uj(τ, T − 1)
)
u∗j (T − 1, T − 1)
]
.
It is seen that Ji(T−1) is in the same form as LT−1. Jˆi(T−1)
is obtained by replacing u∗i with uˆ
∗
i . We conclude that Ji(T −
1) ≥ Jˆi(T − 1) because u∗i is the optimal solution to LT−1
when xˆi(T − 1, T − 1) = xi(T − 1, T − 1). Moreover truth
telling is the unique optimal strategy since ri < 0.
We next employ induction, and so assume that truth-telling
of states is the unique subgame perfect dominant strategy
equilibrium at time k. Let Ht be the history up to time t.
If agents are rational, we can take the expectation over future
X(s, s), s ≥ k, which are i.i.d. Gaussian noise vectors, and
calculate Ji(k− 1) (where, as before, we simply take the first
Groves term hi ≡ 0):
Ji(k − 1) =
qix
2
i (k − 1) + riu2i (k − 1)− pi(k − 1) + E [Ji(k)|Hk−1]
= qi
[
xi(k − 1, k − 1) +
k−2∑
s=0
xi(s, k − 1)
]2
+ ri
[
ui(k − 1, k − 1) +
k−2∑
s=0
ui(s, k − 1)
]2
− pi(k − 1)
+ E
[
T−1∑
t=k
(
qix
2
i (t) + riu
2
i (t)− pi(t)
) ∣∣∣∣Hk−1
]
.
(24)
We now prove Lemma 2. We first show that
E[U∗(k, k)|Hk−1] = 0. By completing the square for
Lk in (23), we have the following equivalent problem for the
ISO to solve for the k-th layer:
max
T−1∑
t=k
[(
X(k, t) +
k−1∑
τ=0
X(τ, t)
)T
Q·
(
X(k, t) +
k−1∑
τ=0
X(τ, t)
)
+
(
U(k, t) +
k−1∑
τ=0
U(τ, t)
)T
R·(
U(k, t) +
k−1∑
τ=0
U(τ, t)
)]
. (25)
Now, for the fixed k of interest, letting Y (t) := X(k, t) +∑k−1
τ=0 X(τ, t), and V (t) := U(k, t) +
∑k−1
τ=0 U(τ, t), we see
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that Y (t) = AY (t−1)+BV (t−1) for t ≥ k+1. The “initial”
condition is Y (k) = X(k). For this linear system, the optimal
control law for the cost (25) under the balancing constraint
for all t is a control law that is linear in the state. Denoting
the optimal gain by K(t), we have
U∗(k, k) +
k−1∑
τ=0
U(τ, k) = K(k)
[
X(k, k) +
k−1∑
τ=0
X(τ, k)
]
.
Similarly, at time k−1, the ISO chooses the allocation at time
k by using the same gain K(t) applied to that portion of the
state at time k resulting from disturbances up to time k − 1:
U(k − 1, k) +
k−2∑
τ=0
U(τ, k) =
k−1∑
τ=0
U(τ, k) = K(k)·[
X(k − 1, k) +
k−2∑
τ=0
X(τ, k)
]
= K(k)
[
k−1∑
τ=0
X(τ, k)
]
.
Consequently,
E[U∗(k, k)|Hk−1] = K(k)E[X(k, k)|Hk−1] = 0,
since all agents are truth-telling at time k, i.e.,
E[X(k, k)|Hk−1] = E[W (k − 1)] = 0. From (21),
by linearity of the system, we consequently also
have E[X(k, t)|Hk−1] = 0, k < t ≤ T − 1, and
E[U(k, t)|Hk−1] = 0, k < t ≤ T − 1. Therefore, for
k ≤ t ≤ T − 1,
E[x2i (t)|Hk−1] = E
[
t∑
τ=k
xi(τ, t) +
k−1∑
s=0
xi(s, t)
]2
=
[
k−1∑
s=0
xi(s, t)
]2
+ C = x2i (k − 1, t) + 2xi(k − 1, t)·
k−2∑
s=0
xi(s, t) +
[
k−2∑
s=0
xi(s, t)
]2
+ C,
where C is a fixed term corresponding to the variance of∑t
τ=k xi(τ, t) and
[∑k−2
s=0 xi(s, t)
]2
could be treated as a
constant since it depends only previous bids. Similarly, we
have, for t ≥ k,
E[u2i (t)|Hk−1] =
u2i (k − 1, t) + 2ui(k − 1, t)
k−2∑
s=0
ui(s, t) +
[
k−2∑
s=0
ui(s, t)
]2
+ C,
We also have,
E[pi(t)|Hk−1] = const.,
since E[xj(t, τ)|Hk−1] = 0 and E[uj(t, τ)|Hk−1] = 0, for
τ ≥ t. By ignoring the constant term, we now have,
Ji(k − 1) =
qix
2
i (k − 1, k − 1) + 2qixi(k − 1, k − 1)
k−2∑
s=0
xi(s, k − 1)
+riu
2
i (k − 1, k − 1) + 2riui(k − 1, k − 1)
k−2∑
s=0
ui(s, k − 1)
+
T−1∑
t=k
[
qix
2
i (k − 1, t) + 2qixi(k − 1, t)
k−2∑
s=0
xi(s, t)
]
+
T−1∑
t=k
[
riu
2
i (k − 1, t) + 2riui(k − 1, t)
k−2∑
s=0
ui(s, t)
]
−pi(k − 1)
=
T−1∑
t=k−1
[
qix
2
i (k − 1, t) + riu2i (k − 1, t)
+ 2qi
(
k−2∑
τ=0
xi(τ, t)
)
xi(k − 1, t)
+ 2ri
(
k−2∑
τ=0
ri(τ, t)
)
ri(k − 1, t)
]
− pi(k − 1).
It is straightforward to check that Ji(k − 1) is in the same
form as Lk−1 and thus we conclude that truth-telling xˆi(k −
1, k − 1) = xi(k − 1, k − 1) is the unique dominant strategy
for agent i at time k − 1.
In the proof we have actually established the following
stronger result:
Corollary 1. In the stochastic VCG mechanism, truth-telling
of states constitutes a subgame perfect dominant strategy
equilibrium.
A. LQG systems with unknown system parameters
The case where the ISO does not know the system param-
eters, system dynamic equations, noise statistics, and utility
functions, poses formidable difficulties and we conjecture that
there is no mechanism with truth telling as a dominant strategy.
Above, the key to proving incentive compatibility for the
layered VCG mechanism lies in the fact that the optimal
feedback gain K(k) remains unchanged for each round of
bids. This is due to the fact that K(k) is only a function of
Q, R, A, and B. Therefore, if bidding of system parameters
at the beginning is allowed, then the layered VCG mechanism
is not incentive compatible. We show this by the following
counterexample.
Example 2. Let T = 4. The agents’ system equations and
cost matrices have the following parameters: (a1, a2, a3, a4) =
(1, 1, 1, 1), (b1, b2, b3, b4) = (1, 1, 1, 1), (q1, q2, q3, q4) =
(−1,−1,−1,−1), (r1, r2, r3, r4) = (−1,−1.1,−1.2,−1.1),
(ζ1, ζ2, ζ3, ζ4) = (0.3, 0.32, 0.31, 0.3) and (σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4) =
(0.1, 0.11, 0.11, 0.12). If system operator knows all the pa-
rameters of agents, and every agent bid its true state, then
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the expected net utility of agent 1 (expected total utility
minus expected total payment) is 0.629. When agents are also
allowed to bid their system parameters at the beginning, truth-
telling of state may not be incentive compatible. Suppose that
agents 2, 3, 4 remain truthful, namely, bid their true system
parameters at the beginning and their true states at all times.
Suppose now that agent 1 intentionally bids an untruthful
qˆ1 = −1.3 while bidding other parameters truthfully at the
beginning. Assume also that agent 1 always bids its state as
if there is no noise (w1(t) ≡ 0). Now agent 1’s net expected
utility is 0.631. Therefore, agent 1’s optimal strategy is not to
bid its true state when it is allowed to bid its system parameters
at the beginning. 
The assumption that the ISO knows the system parameters
A, B, Q and R of the agents can perhaps be justified since the
ISO can learn these parameters by running a VCG scheme for
the day-ahead market, a dynamic deterministic market, where
agents are guaranteed to bid their true system parameters as
shown in the previous section, and system parameters remain
unchanged when agents participate in the real-time stochastic
market.
B. Budget Balance and Individual Rationality in LQG systems
We extend the notion of scaling and the associated SVCG
mechanism to the stochastic dynamic systems as follows.
Consider the payments
pi(s) := c ·
∑
j 6=i
T−1∑
t=s
[
qj xˆ
2
j (s, t) + rju
(i)2
j (s, t)
+ 2qj
(
s−1∑
τ=0
xˆj(τ, t)
)
xˆj(s, t) + 2rj
(
s−1∑
τ=0
u
(i)(τ,t)
j
)
u
(i)
j (s, t)
]
−
∑
j 6=i
T−1∑
t=s
[
qj xˆ
2
j (s, t) + rju
∗2
j (s, t)
+ 2qj
(
s−1∑
τ=0
xˆj(τ, t)
)
xˆj(s, t) + 2rj
(
s−1∑
τ=0
uj(τ, t)
)
u∗j (s, t)
]
,
where u(i)j (s, t) is the optimal solution to the following prob-
lem:
max
∑
j 6=i
T−1∑
t=s
[
qjx
2
j (s, t) + u
2
j (s, t)
+ 2qj
(
s−1∑
τ=0
xj(τ, t)
)
xj(s, t) + 2rj
(
s−1∑
τ=0
uj(τ, t)
)
uj(s, t)
]
subject to
xj(s, t) = ajxj(s, t− 1) + bjuj(s, t− 1), for s < t ≤ T − 1,∑
j 6=i
uj(s, t) = 0, for s ≤ t ≤ T − 1,
xj(s, s) = xˆj(s, s).
As in the static case, based on its prior knowledge of a suitable
range for c, the ISO can choose a range of c, which does not
depend on the agents’ bids, to achieve BB and IR.
Truth-telling is a dominant strategy under the SVCG mech-
anism because it falls under the Groves mechanism. Under the
dominant strategy equilibrium, every agent i will bid its true
state xi(s, s), i.e., wi(s− 1).
Theorem 7. Let U∗(t) be the optimal solution to the following
problem:
max E
T−1∑
t=0
[XT (t)QX(t) + UT (t)RU(t)]
subject to
X(t+ 1) = AX(t) +BU(t) +W (t),
1TU(t) = 0, for ∀t,
X(0) ∼ N (0, Z),W ∼ N (0,Σ).
Let X(i)(t) := [x1(t), ..., xi−1(t), xi+1(t), ...xN (t)]T , and
similarly let Q(i), R(i), A(i), B(i), Z(i) and Σ(i) be the matrix
with the i-th component removed. Let U (i)(t) be the optimal
solution to the following problem:
max E
T−1∑
t=0
[X(i)T (t)Q(i)X(i)(t) + UT (t)R(i)U(t)]
subject to
X(i)(t+ 1) = A(i)X(i)(t) +B(i)U(t) +W (i)(t),
1TU(t) = 0, for ∀t,
X(i)(0) ∼ N (0, Z(i)),W (i) ∼ N (0,Σ(i)).
Let Hi := E
∑T−1
t=0 [X
(i)T (t)Q(i)X(i)(t) +
U (i)T (t)R(i)U (i)(t)] and let Hmax := maxiHi. Let
Ftotal = E
∑T−1
t=0 [X
T (t)QX(t)+UT (t)RU(t)]. If Ftotal > 0,
Hi > 0 for all i, and MPB (3) condition holds, there exists an
c and c¯, with c ≤ c¯ such that if the constant c is chosen in the
range [c, c¯], then the SVCG mechanism for the deterministic
dynamic system satisfies IC, EF, BB and IR at the same time.
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that under the earlier
dominant strategy,
E
[ T−1∑
s=0
pi(s)
]
= c ·Hi − E
∑
j 6=i
T−1∑
t=0
(
qjx
2
j (t) + rju
∗2
j (t)
)
since wi’s are i.i.d. and ui(t) is linear in xi(t). Hence, to
achieve budget balance, we need,
E
[∑
i
T−1∑
s=0
pi(s)
]
= c ·
∑
i
Hi − (N − 1)Ftotal ≥ 0,
or equivalently,
c ≥ (N − 1)Ftotal∑
iHi
.
To achieve individual rationality for agent i, we need
E
[
T−1∑
t=0
(
qix
2
i (t) + riu
∗2
i (t)
)− T−1∑
s=0
pi(s)
]
=Ftotal − c ·Hi ≥ 0,
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or equivalently, c ≤ Ftotal
Hi
. Combining both inequalities, we
have
(N − 1)Ftotal∑
iHi
≤ c ≤ Ftotal
Hmax
.
Let c = (N−1)Ftotal∑
iHi
and c¯ = FtotalHmax . To ensure c ≤ c¯, one
sufficient condition is,
(N − 1)Hmax ≤
∑
i
Hi, Ftotal > 0, Hi > 0 for all i.
C. Lagrange Optimality in LQG Systems
In general, just as for a static problem, the SVCG mecha-
nism is not Lagrange optimal. Within the feasible range [c, c¯],
one can choose a c that achieves near Lagrange optimality.
This can be formulated as a MinMax problem:
min
c
max
i
∣∣∣∣∣ di(c)E∑T−1t=0 [λ∗(t)u∗i (t)]
∣∣∣∣∣ , subject to (4),
where
di(c) := E
T−1∑
t=0
[λ∗(t)u∗i (t)− pi(t)]
= E
T−1∑
t=0
[λ∗(t)u∗i (t)]− c ·Hi + E
[
T−1∑
t=0
(
qjx
2
j (t) + rju
∗2
j (t)
)]
.
The MinMax problem can be transformed to a linear pro-
gram:
min Z
subject to
Z ≥ di(c)
E
∑T−1
t=0 [λ
∗(t)u∗i (t)]
, for all i,
Z ≥ − di(c)
E
∑T−1
t=0 [λ
∗(t)u∗i (t)]
, for all i,
(N − 1)Ftotal∑
iHi
≤ c ≤ Ftotal
Hmax
.
We illustrate the MinMax problem with a numerical example
below.
Example 3. We use the same system parameters as in Ex-
ample 2. The optimal solution to the MinMax problem is
(c∗, Z∗) = (0.96, 0.21). Thus, by choosing c = 0.96, the
SVCG mechanism satisfies IC, EF, BB and IR, and all agents
expect to pay/receive within 21% of their expected Lagrange
optimal payments.
Just as for deterministic systems, as the number of agents in-
creases, the scaled-VCG mechanism does achieve asymptotic
Lagrange Optimality.
Theorem 8. If (ak, bk, pk, qk, ζk, σk) for 1 ≤ k ≤ N satisfy
the following:
1) a ≤ |ai|≤ a¯, b ≤ |bi|≤ b¯, q ≤ qi ≤ q¯ < 0 and r ≤ ri ≤
r¯ < 0
2) Ftotal > 0, Hi > 0 for all i, and MPB condition holds,
then the following holds:
1) There is a range within which cN can be chosen to
achieve BB and IR, and limN→∞ cN = 1,
2) Asymptotic Lagrange Optimality:
limN→∞ E
∑T−1
t=0
[
λN (t)uNi (t)− pNi (t)
]
= 0, where
the random variable λN (t) is the Lagrange multiplier
corresponding to the power balance constraint.
Proof. At each layer, the ISO is solving a deterministic LQR
problem, and from Theorem 5 we have,
lim
N→∞
L∗s
Hs,1
= 1, for 0 ≤ s ≤ T − 1,
where L∗s is the maximum value of Ls, and Hs,1 is the
maximum social welfare when agent 1 is excluded. Moreover,
as we have shown in Theorem 6, the sum of U∗(s, t) cal-
culated at each layer is indeed the optimal solution U∗(t) =∑t
s=0 U
∗(s, t). Consequently,
lim
N→∞
FNtotal
HN1
= lim
N→∞
E
∑T−1
s=0 L
∗
s
E
∑T−1
s=0 Hs,1
= 1.
Similarly we can show that limN→∞
FNtotal
HNk
= 1 for k 6= 1.
Therefore, limN→∞ c¯N = 1. Let Hmin = minHi. Since
(N−1)FNtotal
NHmax
≤ cN ≤ (N−1)FNtotalNHmin , limN→∞ cN = 1. Hence,
lim
N→∞
cN = 1.
We next show that the total expected VCG payment converges
to the total expected Lagrange payment when N goes to
infinity. To calculate λN (t), we solve the following one-step
problem to determine its Lagrange multiplier:
max
U(t)
XT (t)QX(t)+UT (t)RU(t)+E
[
XT (t+ 1)Pt+1X(t+ 1)
]
subject to
1TU(t) = 0. (26)
where Pt is the Ricatti matrix of the unconstrained prob-
lem where balance constraint 1TU(t) = 0, or u1(t) =
−∑Ni=2 ui(t) is substituted in both the objective and the state
equation.
The Lagrangian is,
L =XT (t)QX(t) + UT (t)RU(t)
+ E
[
XT (t+ 1)Pt+1X(t+ 1)
]− λN (t)1TU(t)
Take partial derivative with respect to U(t) and λ(t), we have
∂L
∂U(t)
=2RU(t) + 2BTPt+1BU(t) + 2B
TPt+1AX(t)− λN (t)1 = 0.
The Lagrange multiplier λN (t) is thus calculated from (26)
as:
λN (t) = 2
[
1T (R+BTPt+1B)
−11
]−1 ·
1T (R+BTPt+1B)
−1BTPt+1AX(t) := ΦtX(t). (27)
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At time s, we denote λN (s, t) as the Lagrange multipliers
associated with the balance constraint 1TU(s, t) = 0. From
Theorem 5, we have
lim
N→∞
[(
T−1∑
t=s
λN (s, t)u∗Ni (s, t)
)
− pNi (s)
]
= 0.
Summing over s, we have
lim
N→∞
T−1∑
s=0
[(
T−1∑
t=s
λN (s, t)u∗Ni (s, t)
)
− pNi (s)
]
= lim
N→∞
T−1∑
t=0
[(
t∑
s=0
λN (s, t)u∗Ni (s, t)
)
− pNi (t)
]
= 0.
From (25), we have, at time s,
λN (s, t) = Φt
s∑
τ=0
X(τ, t),
and at time s− 1,
λN (s− 1, t) = Φt
s−1∑
τ=0
X(τ, t).
Therefore,
λN (s, t) = λN (s− 1, t) + ΦtX(s, t).
The Lagrange multiplier λN (t) associated with the balance
constraint 1TU(t) = 0 can be calculated as:
λN (t) = ΦtX(t) = Φt
t∑
s=0
X(s, t) = λN (t, t).
As a result,
λN (t)u∗Ni (t) = λ
N (t)
t∑
s=0
u∗Ni (s, t)
=
t∑
s=0
[(
λN (s, t) + Φt
t∑
τ=s+1
X(τ, t)
)
u∗Ni (s, t)
]
Because X(0) is independent of W (t) and W (t) are i.i.d.,
E[X(τ, t)u∗Ni (s, t)] = 0, for τ ≥ s+ 1,
Therefore,
lim
N→∞
E
T−1∑
t=0
[
λN (t)u∗Ni (t)− pNi (t)
]
= lim
N→∞
E
T−1∑
t=0
[(
t∑
s=0
λN (s, t)u∗Ni (s, t)
)
− pNi (t)
]
= 0.
D. LQG systems with partially observed states
The above results can be extended in a straightforward man-
ner to the partially observed case where a linear transformation
of the state is observed under additive white Gaussian noise.
This can be done by considering the hyperstate, the conditional
distribution of the state, which evolves as a linear system
driven by the innivaitons process. In this case, the state noise
corresponds to the innovations process, which is effectively
what the agents are being asked to bid.
VI. LINEAR NON-GAUSSIAN AGENTS WITH QUADRATIC
COSTS
We now consider the case where the agents are linear
and still have quadratic costs, but their state noises, while
independent, are not Gaussian.
Definition 8. We say that a mechanism achieves “linear
efficiency” if it attains the best cost that can be obtained
through linear feedback.
The mechanism for the LQG case also achieves linear
efficiency when the noises are zero mean and white, but non-
Gaussian. This result rests on the fact that the mechanism
achieves intertemporal decoupling.
Theorem 9. The SVCG mechanism can ensure incentive
compatibility and linear efficiency.
Proof. The proof follows the steps of the proof of the Theorem
6 for LQG since the crucial idea there is to obtain uncorrelat-
edness as in Lemma 2, which follows from the linear control
law.
In general however, nonlinear strategies may achieve even
lower cost, but the SVCG mechanism can only guarantee the
optimal cost in the class of linear feedback laws.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
It remains an open problem if it is possible to construct
a mechanism that ensures the dominance of dynamic truth-
telling for agents comprised of general stochastic dynamic sys-
tems. We conjecture that it is not feasible in general. We have
shown that for the special case of LQG agents with known
system parameters, by careful construction of a sequence of
layered VCG payments over time, the intertemporal effect of
current bids on future payoffs can be decoupled, and truth-
telling of dynamic states is guaranteed if system parameters
are known and agents are rational. It achieves subgame perfect
dominance of truth telling strategies and social welfare opti-
mality. We have also shown that a modification of the VCG
payments, called Scaled-VCG, achieves Budget Balance and
Individual Rationality for a range of scaling factors, under
a certain Market Power Balance condition. This condition
provides economic justification for Load Serving entities or
Load Aggregators that group small consumers as a means
for achieving social welfare optimality. If the noises are not
Gaussian, then the mechanism achieves optimal social welfare
in the class of linear strategies. In the asymptotic regime of
increasing population of agents, the Scaled-VCG payments
converge to the Lagrange payments, the payments that the
agents would make in the absence of strategic considerations.
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